The final episode of C5's Britain's Close Encounters featured the Alderney UFO case. In April 2007, a passenger plane pilot on a routine flight between Southampton and Alderney spotted a pair of bright yellow objects; during the twelve minute encounter the pilot was able to examine the object through binoculars and communicate with air traffic control, who asked other pilots in the area for confirmation; one other pilot radioed in visual contact with something similar. Passengers on the first plane also saw the objects, and at least one of them was invited to view them through the pilot's binoculars.
Interesting stuff.
Then, on cue, we get Richard Wiseman.
Wiseman talks about how pilots momentarily glimpsing an item they cannot categorise may interpret it, at the time or with the benefit of hindsight, as something other than it actually was. Their testimony may thus be sincere, but inaccurate.
This is an example of Wisemanism. Richard Wiseman is often a culprit, and so has the honour of having the fallacy named after him; Sue Blackmore also used to be a notable Wisemanist.

The Anatomy of a Wisemanism
Wisemanism is a fallacy, and it happens thus:
You state p, which is a particular event.
I assert q, which is a generalisation, in such a way as to suggest that p is an instance of, or is governed by, q. However, it isn't, and I know it, else I haven't bothered to look.
For example, in the Alderney programme, we are shown the eye witness accounts of the event (p), and then Wiseman pops up and states that such momentary glimpses of things pose a cognitive problem, thereby implying that the Alderney sighting falls under this category (q).
Conversational implicature is at work here; as Wiseman is being presented as a commentator on the case, we expect his statement to be relevant. In fact, it is not. Moreover, we can assent to q in principle, but it does not apply in this particular case. That means our objection is a 'yes, but...'; unfortunately, 'yes, buts' are not good soundbites, and so tend to get lost in the edit.
How and Whys and Wherefores
Why does Wisemanism arise?
Well, partly it is editing, and partly it is the pundit him or herself.
The juxtaposition of witness and pundit leads to Wisemanism; contemporary documentary makers go in for such juxtapositions in a big way. Such cutting and jumping brings about violations of conversational implicature. The fault lies with programme makers, editors in particular, and perhaps with audiences whose attention span cannot handle watching an actual conversation.
And then there is the pundit. A busy expert regularly called on to contribute soundbites to documentaries may well pull together a collection of responses to pull out of a hat at a moment's notice. In this case, Wiseman is asked about pilots sighting UFOs, and he pulls out his stock response.
Had he considered what he would be seen commenting on? Probably not, or if he had he showed it scant regard. Either way, it is a poor performance by a professional academic whom we would assume would be playing by the rules of scholarly discourse all undergraduates learn.
Another case of Wisemanism in action is the C4 documentary on The Enfield Poltergeist case.
The documentary interviewed the journalists who had witnessed phenomena at the house, attempted to film it and then filed the story to appear the following day.
Cut to Wiseman, who goes on about how eye witness testimony is unreliable as the further we get from the event, the more imaginative our reconstructions.
But Richard, they noted down their impressions and filed them immediately. Moreover, their account of the events is corroborated by others present.
Wiseman states a general principle (which is valid, as often as not) except that, in this case, it is irrelevant. Yes, we can assent to the principle, but not to its application in this instance.
Does it Matter?
Need we really bother noting this, and subject it to analysis?
Yes, on two counts.
First, it highlights the inappropriate style adopted by documentary makers. That a format is popular does not mean it is best, or even adequate.
Second, it highlights the irony entailed by CSICOP-style pundits who profess to be champions of reason, and yet regularly violate the canons of logic and sound argument. Either they are oblivious to the rules (and so pretentious) or they disregard them when it suits them to do so (in which case they are acting in bad faith). Either way, questions need to be asked regarding what qualifies this media-savvy element of the secular-humanist and sceptical movements, which seems to have persuaded programme makers and editors that theirs is a voice worth hearing.
Perhaps it is all down to the edit, and they are all masters of Socratic dialectic. The consistency with which solecisms occur, however, suggests that it is more than just the format imposing its limitations.
Everybody suffers logical lapses: I do, you do. Not everyone, however, promotes themselves as public educators bent on liberating us poor benighted souls from superstition through the light of reason; when such as these regularly lapse into fallacy, it is as well we ask why, and whether we should take them seriously.
Should you be reading, Richard, I very much look forward to hearing from you. I am all ears.